There’s a recurring but dangerous rhythm in our politics: private money flows into party campaigns or politicians’ lifestyles, often through middlemen.
In return, donors are rewarded with government tenders. This dangerous feedback loop – from donation to procurement – is the foundation of SA’s corruption ecosystem.
The explosive revelations by Lt-Gen Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi, now under investigation by the Madlanga commission and parliament’s ad hoc committee, suggest this pattern now penetrates the criminal justice system, which is the last line of defence in any democracy.
This pattern is not new. In the early 1990s, with Soviet support gone, the ANC – a government in waiting – was cash-strapped, and domestic big business stepped in, creating a “dual constituency”, where it answered to voters and to donors.
Since then, a recognisable pattern has repeated itself – private donations buy political influence that is repaid through government tenders.
In 1994, Bantu Holomisa revealed that Sol Kerzner donated R500,000 to the ANC’s campaign. Mandela acknowledged it – an early sign of money seeking proximity to power.
In 1999, Schabir Shaik donated nearly a million to the ANC while funding Jacob Zuma’s lifestyle. In return, Zuma – then deputy president – used his political connectivity to secure tenders for Shaik’s companies.
Then came “Oilgate” (2004): PetroSA, under ministerial pressure, routed R11m to the ANC via Imvume Management, headed by Sandi Majali.
In 2007, Hitachi Power Africa won a R38.5bn tender, where the ANC’s Chancellor House held a 25% stake.
Fast-forward to the Zondo commission that made the link crystal clear. Bosasa disguised bribes as donations totalling R75.7m to capture department of correctional services tenders.
Even the sealed “CR17” campaign funding records underlined a deeper issue: private campaign funding creates dependencies that later shadow public decisions.
On July 6, Mkhwanazi publicly claimed that a sophisticated criminal syndicate (controlled by the “Big Five” drug cartel) had infiltrated SAPS and prosecutorial and intelligence structures.
He alleged that the political killings task team (PKTT), which investigated political assassinations linked to municipal tender corruption, had been disbanded due to political interference.
In response, the presidency established the Madlanga commission, while parliament launched an ad hoc committee.
During in-camera testimony, a PKTT member, “Witness C”, detailed a raid at the home of alleged cartel member Vusimuzi “Cat” Matlala. Matlala claimed connectedness to senior SAPS officials, including suspended deputy national commissioner Shadrack Sibiya.
To back his claims, Matlala reportedly showed their personal contacts and boasted about securing a R1.2bn SAPS tender with help. He further claimed to have paid kickbacks to Sibiya after each tender payout.
The party-funding link also emerges: Brown Mogotsi (ANC backer) reportedly acted as middleman between Matlala and suspended police minister Senzo Mchunu. WhatsApp evidence shows Mogotsi requesting payments from Matlala to fund ANC events (including January 8) supposedly on Mchunu’s behalf.
In another message, Mogotsi informed Matlala that the disbanding of the PKTT was complete, even before its public announcement, attributing it to Mchunu and noting that the “problematic unit” had been addressed.
What’s at stake now is not just tender corruption. It’s the integrity of law enforcement agencies, the public’s trust in the rule of law, and the state’s capacity to protect citizens if security institutions are vulnerable to capture by private money.
SA is not without party finance law. The Party Funding Act (PFA) has improved transparency, but transparency is not enough. As long as private money can legally enter political finance, it will seek a return, and the most direct route remains public procurement.
If left unchecked, political office will keep serving as a gateway to wealth for donors and for those they sponsor.
There is only one durable answer: outlaw private party funding, or strictly channel it through the Multi-Party Democracy Fund.
If donors want to support democracy, let it happen via audited, public, and rules-based processes. Let no one accept direct donations, especially while holding public office.
This is not about stifling political participation. It is about protecting democracy from capture.
The criminal justice system must also be shielded from political interference. As Mkhwanazi’s testimony and that of Witnesses A, B and C have shown, law enforcement is most vulnerable when it is open to partisan influence. What’s needed is institutional independence, secure budgets, and appointment processes that resist capture.
But policy alone won’t fix this. The electorate must act. We know the script. We’ve seen the actors. We understand the system.
Heading into the 2026 and 2029 elections, we have a civic duty to remember. Because if we don’t, the same scandals will resurface in new costumes. New donors. New fixers. Same rot.
We cannot panel-discuss our way out of this. Without real jail time for corrupt procurement, and without ending the donation-to-tender conveyor belt, money will continue to buy politicians and, with them, the state itself.
- Mvenene is lecturer of political studies at Walter Sisulu University
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